Research Paper: Arab League and the War

Pages: 12 (3858 words)  ·  Style: APA  ·  Bibliography Sources: 10  ·  Level: College Senior  ·  Topic: History - Israel  ·  Buy This Paper

SAMPLE EXCERPT:

[. . .] The United States' promotion of democracy in the Arab region did not have much credibility with these governments. They were aware of American support of Arab autocrats, like Saddam Hussein up to 1991, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and the royal Saudi family. One inconsistency had to do with the Palestinian Authority's proposal for new elections for its parliament and president for which American assistance was sought. The United States was unusually reluctant in supporting the proposal, considering its urge for elected governments and the need for Palestinian reform as necessary for the peace process (Gwertzman).

National Reconciliation Conference

After a five-day visit to Iraq, Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa claimed that he had succeeded in convincing the Kurds and Shi'ite and Sunni Arabs to convene at a national reconciliation conference in Cairo (Ridolfo 2005). But critics again viewed the League's effort as backed by the United Nations and the United States. Furthermore, critics did not expect very much from the League, which they viewed as ineffective in its avowed role of producing genuine change.. It was seen more as supporting the stability of authoritarian regimes in the region. Most Iraqis viewed the intervention work by the League as coming in too late. From its traditional role of supporter for Sunni Arabs, the League abandoned Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein out of fear of the U.S.-led occupation and the portent of getting into the U.S. democratization agenda. Sadly, no Arab head visited Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Yet the League arrogated upon itself the honor of being the voice of Iraq's disenfranchised Sunni Arabs with or without their approval or agreement (Ridolfo).

Most Kurdish and Shi'ite Arabs did not have much respect or faith in the League, which did little to support either group (Ridolfo 2005). Shi'ite Arabs were a minority group, dominated by the Sunni Arabs. Sunni Arabs traditionally regarded the Shi'ites as closer to Iran than to the Arab world. The Syrian regime was often blamed for the ingress of Islamic insurgents into Iraq in support of Abu Mus'ah al-Zarqawi's movement. As a consequence, the movement targeted the Shi'ite Arabs. On the other hand, Kurds had little value to Arab states because they were not Arabs. The Syrian government thus persecuted the Kurdish minority. Contention between Iraq's Shi'ite and Kurdish leaders and the Arab League reached a high when the League's Secretary-General bewailed the Iraqi draft constitution's failure in recognizing Iraq's "Arab identity." Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari reacted by accusing the League of interfering in purely Iraqi affairs. Eventually, those who drafted the constitution agreed to amend the text to stte that Iraq's "Arab people are part of the Arab nation (Ridolfo)."

Peace Plan

The United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations shared a common vision of a second Arab State evolving from the former Palestine (Singer 2007). For four years, they struggled at the negotiating table. It took four years before they realized that their negotiation skills were so inept and powerless that they became a laughing stock in the Arab world. Their common vision shattered. But instead of reconsidering their vision and coming up with a new policy, which would deviate from the creation of another Arab State, the visionaries joined forces with the Arab League in pursuing its 2000 Peace Initiative. This Peace Initiative had the same goal of creating a second Arab State out of the former Palestine and failed to the smallest detail. The vision and the 2000 Peace Plan Initiative by the League both demanded the return of all Arabs to Israel with their descendants who had not lived there for 60 years. Both the vision and the Peace Initiative demanded the right to expel 400,000 Jews living in the West Bank for the last 40 years. The act constituted ethnic cleansing in its most inhuman form. It also demanded the unconditional return of the entire West Bank to Arab rule. This demand violated the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, which provided that more than a few inches of the West Bank should belong to Israel. The Arab League Peace Initiative was not amenable to bargaining but was an "all-or-nothing proposal." All indications showed that the League's demand for the creation of a second Arab State in the former Palestine had vanished and died. The only and ultimate option was to divide the West Bank between Jordan and Israel. Who would take that option would be the other question (Singer).

The Arab League and Its Fate

Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa announced the fate of the Middle East peace process as dead (CNN 2006). He made the announcement after a heated meeting among the League's foreign ministers in Cairo. He said that only the Security Council had the power to deal with the crisis. It could evaluate all the aspects of the failure of all efforts exerted to make the peace process work, he added. These foreign ministers who represented 18 Arab League nations met to address Israel's attacks on Lebanon and the Palestinian territory of Gaza. Israel's attacks were triggered by the abduction of two Israeli soldiers and the murders of three others by Hezbollah militants during a raid. Israel vowed to free the soldiers and retaliate for the kidnapping. Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora said that the attacks had razed and turned his country into a "disaster zone." He urged for an immediate ceasefire and sought international intervention and help to stop the attacks by Israel's war machines. He deplored Israel's punishing all Lebanese as a nation and that this action lacked moral and legal legitimacy. For his part, U.S. President George W. Bush met with Russian President Vladimir Putin. He called on Syria to influence the Shi'ite group to stop the attacks (CNN).

What the Arabs Must Reconsider

Up to the last minute, the League did not believe that the U.S. would invade Iraq (Taheri 2003). Secretary-General Amr Moussa was "absolutely sure" there would be no war. The Arabs had no policy to prevent it or influence an invasion if it occurred. They did not take steps to analyze the war or its consequences. They simply reverted to their traditional methods of negation and dissimulation. They did not recognize the newly-created Governing Council and thought of suspending Iraq's members at the League. They used the United Nation to cover up for their lack of policy concerning Iraq. They were not unified when the U.S. asked them to allocate peace-keeping troops to Iraq. Some agreed, some disagreed and others only made noises to agree or disagree. Their general attitude was "rejectionism" or saying no because Arabs like to say no. Their policy on Palestine was founded on "rejectionism." It was an attitude, which produced no benefits for the Palestinians who had to give their lives up in exchange for an Arab League:"heroism." Iraq would not lose very much if the League suspended or excluded it. The League's own members did not think very highly about it, in the first place. What the Arabs needed to contend with was what it could mean to it not to recognize the Governing Council in Baghdad. It could not assume that Iraq would cease to exist as a State. The rejectionist attitude or view on Palestine divided and then weakened the Arabs and it was recurring in Iraq. It was dividing the Arabs and giving hints that it could lead to further loss of influence. What appeared to be the most realistic and workable policy on Iraw was to accept the occupation as a temporary but necessary evil and rejecting it as a long-term option. The Arabs could then seek out support from the international community and work for the transfer of power to a freed and elected Iraqi government. Many countries already managed to understand the realities surrounding Iraq. Iran and Turkey gave official recognition to the Governing Council and thus gained the right or option to seek a role in that country. Russia followed suit. The Arabs should make the same choice (Taheri).

The Arab summit in Tunis gave a lot for the members to ponder over. Their disunity, contradictions and discord spelled out the reasons for their failures since the League's beginnings in 1944 (Bhadui 2004). With unfulfilled promises of reform, concern for bloodshed and an overall mood of powerlessness, the League's 22 members still claimed having made history through their calls for human rights and modernization. But they did not say how and when these reforms would take place. Contradictions among them first occurred during the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. This was the first time an Arab country occupied another and it led to the first Gulf War, which the Arabs were not able to prevent. During the Madrid Conference, the Oslo peace process between Israel and the Palestinians was undertaken, which appeased the Arab world. But the Arab-Palestinian conflict blew up in 2000 and the New… [END OF PREVIEW]

Arab-Israeli Conflict 1949-1982 Thesis


Yom Kippur War Thesis


Egypt's Foreign Relations With the United States and the Arab Term Paper


Israel 1948 A2 Coursework


Research Paper


View 116 other related papers  >>

Cite This Research Paper:

APA Format

Arab League and the War.  (2007, September 8).  Retrieved October 23, 2019, from https://www.essaytown.com/subjects/paper/arab-league-war/375378

MLA Format

"Arab League and the War."  8 September 2007.  Web.  23 October 2019. <https://www.essaytown.com/subjects/paper/arab-league-war/375378>.

Chicago Format

"Arab League and the War."  Essaytown.com.  September 8, 2007.  Accessed October 23, 2019.
https://www.essaytown.com/subjects/paper/arab-league-war/375378.