Essay: China Management as China's Economy Slowly Transitions

Pages: 7 (2298 words)  ·  Style: MLA  ·  Bibliography Sources: 10  ·  Level: College Senior  ·  Topic: Business  ·  Buy This Paper

China Management

As China's economy slowly transitions towards a more market-oriented structure, Chinese management is also making a transition. Part of this process is spurred by increased interaction with Western business leaders and the subsequent exposure to Western styles of management. Legal and structural changes, too, have had a profound impact. The concept of corporate governance, for example, has shifted in China bringing with it changes to management styles. Yet, the transitional nature of these changes mirrors the nature of the economy overall, as the government still maintains strong control over China's major businesses. This paper will examine the changes to China's management and corporate governance techniques that have resulted from that nation's economic shift.

Changes in the System

When Deng Xiaoping set out in 1978 to restructure China's economy into what became known as a 'socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics' (Zhu, 2005), the nation took a series of baby steps. By the 1990s and early 2000s China's government-owned firms were allowed to sell 1/3 ownership stake to private investors. The rationale for this was that the economy would benefit from the increased efficiency attributed to private enterprise while allowing the government to maintain control. However, the efficiency gains failed to materialize (Green, 2003).

As a consequence, the Chinese economic reforms moved further, to what became known as two-thirds privatization. Changes to economic incentives reduced the ability of state shareholders to profit from manipulating share prices and stripping assets from their holdings, so these shareholders are increasingly selling their shares to private investors, a group which increasingly includes foreign investors (Ibid).

These changes are profound, in that they shift the balance of power in some Chinese companies from state control to investor control (Ibid). This has significant ramifications for the way that these companies are managed. Traditionally through the course of the economic reforms, the Chinese government has considered growth and maintaining high levels of employment as priorities even above profits. This is still the case with many state-owned enterprises today, as the example of Asia Aluminum bonds shows (Foley & Beales, 2009). When investors control the company, however, then the profit motive becomes paramount. This shifts time frames under which managers work; it shifts their priorities; and it shifts the role of building viable long-term strategies in the business model.

The Asia Aluminum example, wherein a firm with falling demand has maintained production levels to the detriment of bondholders who will receive pennies to the dollar, shows how the Chinese economic system must continue to restructure in order to maintain the confidence of potential foreign investors. The country has been successful in attracting investors, but when faced with these types of losses, investors will increasingly demand better protections. These protections will come in a variety of forms, including the installation of the profit motive and the improvement of corporate governance.

There are encouraging signs. There are many private firms in China, and these often are well-capitalized, efficient and able to compete globally (Gang, 2005). Recognizing this value, the government is moving to allow trade in more of the shares of Chinese firms. This would allow for takeovers, which is not presently the case, and would open the door for an increasing acceptance of the profit motive. The current situation, however, has some private firms operating strictly on the profit motive while others are still run by the government with an entirely different set of motives.

Impacts on Management

The good news for Chinese companies is that managers from the state-run system appear to be adaptable to private-sector management (Ibid). The shift towards a profit motive creates changes in management in several areas. The changes place emphasis on competition and efficiency. Additionally, these changes shift the power structure of the companies, yet thus far this shift has not been entirely to a Western-style power structure.

The value of the profit motive is not lost on the new breed of Chinese managers. As they have become increasingly freed from the constraints of state ownership, they have been able to raise capital, forge alliances and joint ventures and compete globally. As Gang notes, Chinese managers have in many cases found little difficulty with the transition between state-run companies and private enterprises. The traditional management style was paternalistic, and often centered around traditional Confucian values, mixed with Communist doctrine. Even the concept of leadership was relatively unknown prior to the onset of economic reforms (Tsui, 2004). As leaders emerged, they have adopted some Western traits, such as increased risk-taking and higher development and leverage of their own personal capital, but often they retain traditional Chinese authoritative, paternalistic leadership styles (Ibid).

Thus, power still comes from formal authority, despite a slight increase in recognition of personal capital. In state-controlled enterprises, substantial power can only be acquired through formal means, and it is the state which makes those appointments. The shift to the profit motive allows room for performance to become a source of power -- one can reach positions of power by leading, motivating and otherwise succeeding.

China has backed up these moves with strong shareholders' rights legislation. While this move in theory protects state interests in majority-private firms, it also has impacts of management as well. Shareholders have the legal right to participate in major decision making and the selection of manager (Yi, 2006). As a result, managers react to shareholders much the same way they would have reacted to the state previously. There is a performance incentive, the only difference being that profit has become the most important metric.

Financing Constraints

The successes of private enterprise with respect to adapting to the profit motive belie the difficulties that remain for managers in China. Private enterprise has limited options for financing at present. The Chinese government has announced plans to improve access to financing for private enterprises through registration of stock rights (Xinhua, 2009). However, private enterprises not formed through the two-thirds privatization route have limited options to raise capital. They cannot rely on the banks, which have a strong relationship to large government-owned companies. This essentially cuts off bank financing -- funded by private deposits -- as a means by which private Chinese enterprises can raise funds (Green, 2006). The only way for Chinese firms to grow then is to be entirely self-financed. The implication for management is that self-financing is the only way for management to maintain full control over the firm. Thus, a reliance has developed on families and personal networks for start-up capital and on retained earnings for post start-up capital (Gregory & Tenev, 1999).

If the government's announced steps to improve access to capital markets for Chinese private enterprise are successfully implemented, this will impact Chinese management as well. These firms currently have little in the way of corporate governance, since it is the principles who have financed the company all along. When these firms become subject to shareholders' rights legislation, they will need to again shift their approach and begin to adopt a more strict governance regime. As yet, the specific form of the proposed reforms remains to be seen, but the fact that private enterprise will be opened to financing options will bring management style of those firms closer to the management style of publicly-traded Chinese firms as they become subject to many of the same laws.

Triangular Relationship

The introduction of public financing will initiate another new era in Chinese management. As discussed, the present system of management in China still focuses on a paternalistic style, but one in which managers have replaced an omnipresent government with shareholders who are able to exercise operating control of the company. Within private enterprise, the system is more strictly reflective of the profit motive, a strong consideration given that firms must finance themselves internally.

A shift towards public financing for these firms will bring a triangular relationship into play with respect to Chinese business management. Private firms will need to adopt management styles more in line with the expectations of shareholders. This will bring managerial practice of private enterprise back towards that of the 2/3 privatized firms. At the same time, the 2/3 privatized firms and even some of the remaining public firms are in a position where they need to attract foreign investment, a situation exacerbated by the current economic crisis.

The needs of the internal investing community are different than the needs of the domestic investing community. Profit is the defining motive for both, but whereas the domestic investors are willing to take a controlling role in a firm in order to protect their investment, investors in the international community prefer legal system protect their wealth. Failures such as Asia Aluminum will therefore push foreign investors to demand that their interests are as protected as the interests of domestic investors. This leads to a situation where the economic reforms are being pulled towards the development of private enterprise; private enterprise management will move towards a more traditional type of management; and in the partially-privatized firms management will take on aspects of both the international style… [END OF PREVIEW]

Chinese Economy Case Study

Management Theories Are They Different and Do They Work Thesis

Business Environment in China Term Paper

US China Trading Relations Research Proposal

China's Three Gorges Dam and India's Narmada River Research Paper

View 127 other related papers  >>

Cite This Essay:

APA Format

China Management as China's Economy Slowly Transitions.  (2009, June 8).  Retrieved September 20, 2019, from

MLA Format

"China Management as China's Economy Slowly Transitions."  8 June 2009.  Web.  20 September 2019. <>.

Chicago Format

"China Management as China's Economy Slowly Transitions."  June 8, 2009.  Accessed September 20, 2019.