Essay: Concise Analysis of Intelligence and National Security

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[. . .] Principle 5: Public Authority Non-Exemption

The above disclosure conditions are to be adhered to by all public bodies, which include the courts, the parliament, overseers, military, security organizations, intelligence organizations, police forces, heads of government and state, and all divisions of the above. Facts cannot be suppressed citing national security reasons on the mere basis that an intergovernmental organization, another country, or a certain public body or division within a body produced or was imparted the information (Byman, 2014; Bush, 2002).

Principle 6: Overseers' Information Accessibility

Every appeal, ombudsman, and supervisory body, which includes tribunals and courts, ought to be provided with the accessibility of all facts, even national security related facts, irrespective of their level of classification, appropriate to their capacity of fulfilling their duties.

Principle 7: Resources

Governments ought to apportion a sufficient quantity of resources, besides taking additional required steps like appropriately managing archives and issuing regulations, for guaranteeing the observance of these principles in actuality.

Principle 8: Situations of Emergency

During a period of public crisis that is threatening to the country's existence as well as to that of aspects legally and formally proclaimed according to domestic as well as foreign law, governments can deviate from their responsibility with regard to the right of requesting, receiving, and divulging facts only as far as is strictly necessitated by the demands of the circumstance and only as long as and when such a deviation entails no unfairness of any sort and aligns with the government's other duties as per international regulation (Bush, 2002).

The term "National Security" has not be described under the aforementioned Principles. The second principle encompasses the recommendation to define "national security" accurately within national law, as per democratic societal requirements (Bush, 2002).

"Public organizations" encompass every agency in the government's legislative, judicial, and executive branches at every level, government-regulated or -- owned non-state organizations, organizations functioning as governmental agents, and statutory and constitutional organizations (Taylor, 2007).

"Public workers" denote existing and ex-public workforce members, public agency sub-contractors and contractors (this includes the security division).

The "Security sector" comprises of: (i) Security service providers, which includes but isn't restricted to the military, paramilitary, law enforcers such as the police, and non-combatant as well as combatant security and intelligence services; and (ii) every executive department, agency and office in charge of coordinating, overseeing and controlling security service providers (Taylor, 2007; Ujomu, Adelugba & Codesria, 2008).

"Information of concern to the public" denotes facts valuable or of concern to the masses, instead of simply or benefit to the public, not simply of any individual interest as well as whose disclosure happens to be "in the interest of the public," for example, as it is beneficial for public comprehension of government functions.

"Valid interest in national security" denotes an interest whose real goal and basic effect is safeguarding national security, in line with domestic and foreign regulation (Ujomu et al., 2008).

Latest perspectives on National Security

Contemporary security thought ensues rationally from this kind of thought processing. In the precise sense of the word, it represents the import of anticipating events. Rather than simply making predictive decisions regarding events, it encompasses a realization of how our world would subsequently appear together with an identification and implementation of policies capable of decreasing societal risks, through prevention wherever possible and through readiness wherever prevention isn't feasible. Risk constitutes the outcome of the potential of any event, susceptibility to its effects, and effects of those effects should they surface. Preemptive action for anticipating likely problems may, hence, aid in the following three ways: Intelligence may help disrupt the risk or, at the very least, turn the balance against the attackers. Secondly, authorities could take action for decreasing susceptibility on the threat axis. Lastly, prompt situational awareness is needed with the development of an operational threatening scenario, utilizing deep past understanding of concerned groups, their goals, drives and methods (Byman, 2014; Byman, 2017). From this evaluation, operational decisions pertaining to attention and caution states, counter-measures (which cover scientific and technological interventions), and assignments ought to flow. Lastly comes the importance of a longer-run examination of terrorist intents and abilities for informing investments within the governmental counterterrorism plan's 'safeguard' and 'prepare' elements; this plan itself marks a major national security element.

A second national security priority associated with international arenas of potential increased concern during the imminent years is the 'obligation to prevent', which necessitates closer governmental collaboration with associates and allies, in addition to the responsible employment of control and authority in the current highly interdependent global environment (Byman, 2017). Calling attention to the previously broached concept of anticipation, this encompasses timely engagement with countries striving for averting governmental failure, inhibiting conflict, facilitating the stabilization of conflicting territories and creating conditions conducive to development. Further, there is growing appreciation of the significance of dealing with violent extremist sources, and of backing fragile nations' reinforcement of their authority and fostering of their economic growth. Thus, the 'toolbox' must consist of the entire gamut of tools right from guidance and growth support to armed intervention.

The intelligence sector is largely cognizant of this. However, they must anticipate further, challenging requirements for the acknowledgement of strategic intelligence moving far beyond the sphere of the armed forces, considering the novel security challenges, particularly terrorism (Lowenthal, 2015). Intelligence specialists continue to struggle with the ideal way to back civil efforts, which includes forging connections with private security firms and non-governmental organizations operating in territories suffering conflict, as regards both their growing demand for intelligence backing and their respective specialized expertise and information which can offer novel insights.

As has been observed earlier, such anticipatory strategies necessitate intelligence organizations' engagement in prompt warning and more intensive horizon scanning. National security needs security to be regarded with respect to future disasters as well as threats (in other words, threats posed by naturally occurring and not man-made events). The main question here deals with the ideal means to coordinate future horizon scanning. Which option would be better: Building on the preset, longstanding intelligence evaluation processes and warning signs of the security and defense sector (e.g., via the JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee)), or running a parallel process of public horizon scanning more directly associated with JIC? Numerous topics exist where non-confidential or open sources suffice; however, threats will prevail that necessitate secret intelligence potentially possessing unique worth (Lowenthal, 2015; Byman, 2017). Obviously, the biggest added worth of covert intelligence lies in the employment of active measures geared at concealing or camouflaging facts being hunted for, for several highly pressing issues. This is especially true when aggressive rivals attempt to purposefully cover up their motives.

Such long-run national security characteristics will increase pressure for covert intelligence, in addition to expectations on the government's part to desire the capability of threat prevention through the authorization of covert operations. Earlier, such secret organizations varied from interference activities against terror groups, illicit drug traffickers, and proliferators to negotiation in situations where the state couldn't afford the world noticing its direct engagement and back-channel interface (Byman, 2017). In the long-run, these will likely prove to be much more beneficial competences, on the basis of the current security risks' development and character.

Imperatives of national security in Africa

i. Access

In this context, the chief point to highlight is: intelligence needs of entities planning and executing contemporary national security processes will be grounded in 3 kinds of information: open sources, conventional secret sources, and personal confidential information.

Covert intelligence's crux lies in hiring people and intercepting (and whenever required, deciphering) communications. Besides the traditional signal and human intelligence (Sigint and Humint), the novel forms of photo-reconnaissance and satellite intelligence (Imint), signature and measurement intelligence (Masint) and electronic and radar intelligence (Elint) have emerged. The above groups offer a foundation for capability development, hiring, and institutional framework for national-level intelligence circles (Omand, 2009). Countries vary in whether a few or nearly every such activity is directed by national defence, interior or diplomatic departments; however, the basic institutional frameworks grounded in classic kinds of source continue to be identical.

Web-based self-regulating instruments are applied, at least in America's intelligence sector, and thus, may be deemed crucial for nations in the African continent as well. Further, intelligence targets rely on the World Wide Web, as evidenced by jihadists' resourceful application of social media and other websites for promoting their radical thoughts, recruiting members, circulating data on their targets, arms, and strategies, and maintaining internal contact with fellow members. Hence, there is a dire need for a whole new intelligence division aimed at accessing, monitoring and exploiting this content (Byman, 2017). Such data revolution, however, does nothing to replace the necessity of more conventional covert intelligence forms; nevertheless, it doesn't remain the 'poor relation' any longer.

There is a need to mention, in the context of the incredible transformations occurring in the Osint realm, the development of yet another information… [END OF PREVIEW]

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https://www.essaytown.com/subjects/paper/concise-analysis-intelligence-national/6624465.