Course of Action Decision Professional Writing
Pages: 16 (4284 words) · Bibliography Sources: 1 · File: .docx · Level: Master's · Topic: Military
¶ … Action Decision Brief
"What you want to do is to weigh all the numerous issues, distinguishing that in war some data could be wrong, that a lot is missing totally, and there are all sorts of essentials over which you have no control…. You have got to weigh all of these things and come to a decision as to what you want to do." Field Marshall William Slim
Agenda
Situation update.
Planning considerations.
Guidance received.
Centers of gravity.
Area of operations.
COAs.
Analysis of COAs.
COA comparison.
Risks.
Situation Update
Operations in water are restricted Numerous landing field exist all over the district.
would have to rely on its own intelligence to control the correctness of completed strikes and the degree of damage to key targets, since Iran would almost certainly move quickly to expel inspectors from the IAEA.
IRAN has 319 combat capable aircraft with pilots.
Inadequate Nautical skills.
Strategy of U.S.U.S. policy statements indicate that the objective of military action against Iran would be to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon
Mission
Higher. By the ORDERS of the SECRETARY of DEFENSE, COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND CONDUCTS MILITARY OPERATIONS, in SUPPORT of AZERBIAJAN) to PROTECT and DEFEND the ARABIAN BORDER.
Get full
access
for only $8.97. Restated mission. When directed U.S. European Command executes Flexible Preventive Decisions to discourage IRAN attack against AZERBIAJAN. When the order, USEUCOM organizes extra forces to the area of maneuvers and takes actions to discourage and protect AZERBIAJAN contrary to a IRAN attack; and if essential conduct aggressive processes to restore the pre-conflict international borders of AZERBIAJAN. The Government of AZERBIAJAN, conducts constancy operations, and changes operations back to the AZERBIAJAN Defense Forces or other chosen power when absorbed. .
Significant factors that effect COAs.
-Controlling units, Soldiers, and fires.
-Identifying and engaging targets.
- Navigating and moving.
- Distinguishing friendly and enemy Soldiers.
-Locating, treating, and evacuating casualties.
-Locating and bypassing or breaching enemy obstacles
Primary source for this slide comes from the limitations determined during mission analysis:
Injury, occupational illness or death.
Equipment damage.
Mission degradation.
Reduced morale.
Adverse publicity
Those factors that seriously impact CONOPS:
Force flow
"Host country will allow temporary basing of Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs)."
Infrastructure
Limited ports.
Small airfields.
"We have the strategic lift but only one POD with limited MOG."
Weather
"In 5 days the monsoon season begins and will last for 3 months."
Limited flight permissions
"We have to fly around country X to get our CAP to the AO causing less TOS and fewer sorties per ATO cycle."
6
COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE
"Take no option off the table" to stop Iran from building a nuclear bomb and attacking Azerbaijan.
The purposes of the new Azerbaijan Administration are not obvious; however, the already strained relations between Iran and Azerbaijan, which acts as an outpost of the United States and Israel on the Caspian Sea, have continued to worsen in recent days.
We have the purpose of the operation is to locate the enemy's base camps or other fixed sites, the company concept must avoid inconclusive fights between small units. For the protection of Azerbaijan and return of stability to the area. Therefore, we are going to recruit CAP actions.
It is necessary for the J-5 to progress some cautious courses of action for procedures in protection of Azerbaijan that we will forward to the SECDEF & POTUS for their consideration. -- Scenario Reference Book No. 1.
ASSUMPTIONS
Assumptions utilized in COA procedure:
The engineer effort will be centralized to support the preparation of battle positions, obstacle emplacement, and clearing routes in Iran.
The width of the infantry battalion subdivision be contingent on the nature of the buildings, obstacles along the street, and the time that the enemy must be delayed.
Operational CoGs
Friendly Forces
Friendly Intel action
Threat reaction to friendly actions
Friendly counteraction to threat reaction
Critical Capabilities
Force Projection-Deploy, Sustain, Lethality, Maneuver
Mission Command
Visualize the flow of operations
Action- Reaction / Threat Consequence-Counteraction"
Critical Requirements
Access to APOD/SPOD
LOCs
Host Nation Support
CAISR
Mobility
Missile Defense
Air Superiority
Visualize the flow of operations
Critical Vulnerabilities
LOCs
C4ISR
Air Platforms
Firepower
Priority Targets
Operational Center of Gravity-Friendly
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
9
CoG
Strategic mobility
Lines of communication
Resources
Time
Coalition/allies
Media
Critical Capabilities
State security forces
Unconventional forces,
Terrorists
Sea power
Critical Requirements
tracks, cars, operators,
Critical Vulnerabilities
Fuel
Tracks
locomotive
Strategic Center of Gravity-Friendly
Depict the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
10
Operational CoG
Clan support or sharing of power indirect attack against an enemy
economic/industrial capability military / security capability
Critical Capabilities
Acts of terror against population, infrastructure and security services
Demonstrations and propaganda events and printed media
Guerilla attacks against conventional forces in rural areas
Critical Requirements
Command and Control Structure
Finances
Liaisons
Leadership
Training
IO
Critical Vulnerabilities
Liaisons-SAPA representation to clan
Lines of communications are just rails in a railroad in need of a locomotive
Coalition partners or allies might be required to bring
The media is a tool to influence the will of the people and key leaders, which is only a requirement.
Operational Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
11
Operational CoG
Maintain confidence in ultimate victory or success
Resources/Means to receive Intelligence
Coalition forces
Critical Capabilities
Global Networks
State harboring radical Islamic fundamentalism
Rise of networks means that power is migrating to non-state actors
Critical Requirements
the reliance on information technology
to advance their capabilities
Globalization
Critical Vulnerabilities
Communication Links
*Globalization
*Increased autonomy of network
*Financial Basis
*Muslim Diaspora
*International Cooperation
Strategic Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy
Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
12
CoG
Ideology
freedom of movement, insurgent safe havens
Critical Capabilities
Fundamentalist Sheik
Belief in Cause
Shared Intelligence
Critical Requirements
Resources/Means to receive Intelligence
Time
Critical Vulnerabilities
Lack of credible HUMINT
Technological competence
Maintaining Focus
INSURGENTS
Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
13
JOA
The light blue arrow marked SEABASE has CSG / MPS (F) underneath -- These stand for Carrier Strike Group and Maritime Prepositioning Force. It is an important tenet of modern expeditionary warfare that seabasing is actually preferred to land basing .
The green arrrow marked MAGTF refers to Marine Air Ground Task Force. ARG means Amphibious Ready Group. LOTS refers to Logistics Over the Shore. STOM is a Ship to Objective manoevre. Forcible Entry should be self-explanatory.
Depict only what is needed to illustrate the COA.
"Stay out of the weeds."
JSOA
AOA
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
14
Logical Lines of Operations
International borders reestablished in the region.
Red military defeated.
Red offensive capability neutralized.
Red regime removed and replaced with government favorable to coalition interests.
Occupation and stabilization duties transitioned to non-U.S. force within 12 months.
Gain air & maritime superiority.
Support DOS and OGA.
Conduct stability operations.
Support Yellow leadership.
Mass combat power and sustainment.
Strategic end state
Retrograde coalition forces.
Attack strategic-level targets.
Security/Information Military
Governance
Economic
Diplomacy
Security
Information
Maintain sovereign state.
Secure Yellow borders.
Control population centers.
Isolate leadership
Establish legitimate coalition.
De-legitimize Red government.
Establish relationships with regional leadership.
Compel Red regime to step down.
Red is better off now than before.
Diplomatic isolation.
Modernize Yellow infrastructure.
Rebuild/expand SWET/MS.
Enable markets and trade agreements.
Economic sanctions.
Enable markets and trade agreements.
Increase NGO/PVO capacity.
Fund Red opposition.
Build international relief.
Defeat Red offensive.
COA 1
Conduct offensive.
Compel Red regime to give up fight.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
15
SEQUENCING of OPS
LCC
MCC
SOCC
Military
end state
Shape
Deter/seize initiative
Dominate
Stabilize
Enable civil authority/transition / redeploy
2
3
4
1
Build up
Integrate defense
Build up
Defend/CA
Counterattack
CA
Stability
CA
Handover/
scale down
Supporting effort
Main effort
Establish joint AD, ISR
air superiority
Psychological
operations
ISR
ISR/DA//UW
Psychological
operations
ISR/DA/UW
Psychological
operations
FID
CAS / AI
Shape
Support LCC Train Yellow Air
Handover/
scale down
C+DP1
D day
C+DP2
NET C+54
C+DP3
NET C+61
C+DP 4
DPs Decision Criteria CCIRs
1 Red offense defeated. 1 -- Cdr's decision for amphibious operations . PIR- Red offensive culmination imminent.
2 LCC offensive launched. LCC force build up complete.
FFIR- LCC RSOI.
FFIR- amphibious operations success.
3 Transition to stability. Red forces defeated.
IRB restored, DMZ established. FFIR- Yellow infrastructure capacity.
4 Transition to phase 5. Yellow forces capable of managing internal and external affairs. FFIR- Yellow force capability.
PIR- Yellow insurgent activity.
5 Regime change. Actions of Red towards Yellow and JTF. PIR- Red government collapse I & W.
5
Branch
Regime change
Legend
Psychological
operations
SPOD security
Maritime superiority
Maritime security
Amphib assault
Maritime security
Spt LCC
Maritime superiority
Spt ACC
Defeat Red Off. navy
Handover/… [END OF PREVIEW] . . . READ MORE
"What you want to do is to weigh all the numerous issues, distinguishing that in war some data could be wrong, that a lot is missing totally, and there are all sorts of essentials over which you have no control…. You have got to weigh all of these things and come to a decision as to what you want to do." Field Marshall William Slim
Agenda
Situation update.
Planning considerations.
Guidance received.
Centers of gravity.
Area of operations.
COAs.
Analysis of COAs.
COA comparison.
Risks.
Situation Update
Operations in water are restricted Numerous landing field exist all over the district.
would have to rely on its own intelligence to control the correctness of completed strikes and the degree of damage to key targets, since Iran would almost certainly move quickly to expel inspectors from the IAEA.
IRAN has 319 combat capable aircraft with pilots.
Inadequate Nautical skills.
Strategy of U.S.U.S. policy statements indicate that the objective of military action against Iran would be to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon
Mission
Higher. By the ORDERS of the SECRETARY of DEFENSE, COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND CONDUCTS MILITARY OPERATIONS, in SUPPORT of AZERBIAJAN) to PROTECT and DEFEND the ARABIAN BORDER.
Get full

for only $8.97. Restated mission. When directed U.S. European Command executes Flexible Preventive Decisions to discourage IRAN attack against AZERBIAJAN. When the order, USEUCOM organizes extra forces to the area of maneuvers and takes actions to discourage and protect AZERBIAJAN contrary to a IRAN attack; and if essential conduct aggressive processes to restore the pre-conflict international borders of AZERBIAJAN. The Government of AZERBIAJAN, conducts constancy operations, and changes operations back to the AZERBIAJAN Defense Forces or other chosen power when absorbed. .
Professional Writing on Course of Action Decision Brief Assignment
Operational Planning ConsiderationsSignificant factors that effect COAs.
-Controlling units, Soldiers, and fires.
-Identifying and engaging targets.
- Navigating and moving.
- Distinguishing friendly and enemy Soldiers.
-Locating, treating, and evacuating casualties.
-Locating and bypassing or breaching enemy obstacles
Primary source for this slide comes from the limitations determined during mission analysis:
Injury, occupational illness or death.
Equipment damage.
Mission degradation.
Reduced morale.
Adverse publicity
Those factors that seriously impact CONOPS:
Force flow
"Host country will allow temporary basing of Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs)."
Infrastructure
Limited ports.
Small airfields.
"We have the strategic lift but only one POD with limited MOG."
Weather
"In 5 days the monsoon season begins and will last for 3 months."
Limited flight permissions
"We have to fly around country X to get our CAP to the AO causing less TOS and fewer sorties per ATO cycle."
6
COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE
"Take no option off the table" to stop Iran from building a nuclear bomb and attacking Azerbaijan.
The purposes of the new Azerbaijan Administration are not obvious; however, the already strained relations between Iran and Azerbaijan, which acts as an outpost of the United States and Israel on the Caspian Sea, have continued to worsen in recent days.
We have the purpose of the operation is to locate the enemy's base camps or other fixed sites, the company concept must avoid inconclusive fights between small units. For the protection of Azerbaijan and return of stability to the area. Therefore, we are going to recruit CAP actions.
It is necessary for the J-5 to progress some cautious courses of action for procedures in protection of Azerbaijan that we will forward to the SECDEF & POTUS for their consideration. -- Scenario Reference Book No. 1.
ASSUMPTIONS
Assumptions utilized in COA procedure:
The engineer effort will be centralized to support the preparation of battle positions, obstacle emplacement, and clearing routes in Iran.
The width of the infantry battalion subdivision be contingent on the nature of the buildings, obstacles along the street, and the time that the enemy must be delayed.
Operational CoGs
Friendly Forces
Friendly Intel action
Threat reaction to friendly actions
Friendly counteraction to threat reaction
Critical Capabilities
Force Projection-Deploy, Sustain, Lethality, Maneuver
Mission Command
Visualize the flow of operations
Action- Reaction / Threat Consequence-Counteraction"
Critical Requirements
Access to APOD/SPOD
LOCs
Host Nation Support
CAISR
Mobility
Missile Defense
Air Superiority
Visualize the flow of operations
Critical Vulnerabilities
LOCs
C4ISR
Air Platforms
Firepower
Priority Targets
Operational Center of Gravity-Friendly
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
9
CoG
Strategic mobility
Lines of communication
Resources
Time
Coalition/allies
Media
Critical Capabilities
State security forces
Unconventional forces,
Terrorists
Sea power
Critical Requirements
tracks, cars, operators,
Critical Vulnerabilities
Fuel
Tracks
locomotive
Strategic Center of Gravity-Friendly
Depict the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
10
Operational CoG
Clan support or sharing of power indirect attack against an enemy
economic/industrial capability military / security capability
Critical Capabilities
Acts of terror against population, infrastructure and security services
Demonstrations and propaganda events and printed media
Guerilla attacks against conventional forces in rural areas
Critical Requirements
Command and Control Structure
Finances
Liaisons
Leadership
Training
IO
Critical Vulnerabilities
Liaisons-SAPA representation to clan
Lines of communications are just rails in a railroad in need of a locomotive
Coalition partners or allies might be required to bring
The media is a tool to influence the will of the people and key leaders, which is only a requirement.
Operational Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
11
Operational CoG
Maintain confidence in ultimate victory or success
Resources/Means to receive Intelligence
Coalition forces
Critical Capabilities
Global Networks
State harboring radical Islamic fundamentalism
Rise of networks means that power is migrating to non-state actors
Critical Requirements
the reliance on information technology
to advance their capabilities
Globalization
Critical Vulnerabilities
Communication Links
*Globalization
*Increased autonomy of network
*Financial Basis
*Muslim Diaspora
*International Cooperation
Strategic Center of Gravity Analysis-Enemy
Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
12
CoG
Ideology
freedom of movement, insurgent safe havens
Critical Capabilities
Fundamentalist Sheik
Belief in Cause
Shared Intelligence
Critical Requirements
Resources/Means to receive Intelligence
Time
Critical Vulnerabilities
Lack of credible HUMINT
Technological competence
Maintaining Focus
INSURGENTS
Depicted the CoG analysis generated during mission analysis and update throughout COA development.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
13
JOA
The light blue arrow marked SEABASE has CSG / MPS (F) underneath -- These stand for Carrier Strike Group and Maritime Prepositioning Force. It is an important tenet of modern expeditionary warfare that seabasing is actually preferred to land basing .
The green arrrow marked MAGTF refers to Marine Air Ground Task Force. ARG means Amphibious Ready Group. LOTS refers to Logistics Over the Shore. STOM is a Ship to Objective manoevre. Forcible Entry should be self-explanatory.
Depict only what is needed to illustrate the COA.
"Stay out of the weeds."
JSOA
AOA
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
14
Logical Lines of Operations
International borders reestablished in the region.
Red military defeated.
Red offensive capability neutralized.
Red regime removed and replaced with government favorable to coalition interests.
Occupation and stabilization duties transitioned to non-U.S. force within 12 months.
Gain air & maritime superiority.
Support DOS and OGA.
Conduct stability operations.
Support Yellow leadership.
Mass combat power and sustainment.
Strategic end state
Retrograde coalition forces.
Attack strategic-level targets.
Security/Information Military
Governance
Economic
Diplomacy
Security
Information
Maintain sovereign state.
Secure Yellow borders.
Control population centers.
Isolate leadership
Establish legitimate coalition.
De-legitimize Red government.
Establish relationships with regional leadership.
Compel Red regime to step down.
Red is better off now than before.
Diplomatic isolation.
Modernize Yellow infrastructure.
Rebuild/expand SWET/MS.
Enable markets and trade agreements.
Economic sanctions.
Enable markets and trade agreements.
Increase NGO/PVO capacity.
Fund Red opposition.
Build international relief.
Defeat Red offensive.
COA 1
Conduct offensive.
Compel Red regime to give up fight.
JTF-50 COA Presentation Format
DJMO C340 EXERCISE MATERIAL
Reading C340.3
15
SEQUENCING of OPS
LCC
MCC
SOCC
Military
end state
Shape
Deter/seize initiative
Dominate
Stabilize
Enable civil authority/transition / redeploy
2
3
4
1
Build up
Integrate defense
Build up
Defend/CA
Counterattack
CA
Stability
CA
Handover/
scale down
Supporting effort
Main effort
Establish joint AD, ISR
air superiority
Psychological
operations
ISR
ISR/DA//UW
Psychological
operations
ISR/DA/UW
Psychological
operations
FID
CAS / AI
Shape
Support LCC Train Yellow Air
Handover/
scale down
C+DP1
D day
C+DP2
NET C+54
C+DP3
NET C+61
C+DP 4
DPs Decision Criteria CCIRs
1 Red offense defeated. 1 -- Cdr's decision for amphibious operations . PIR- Red offensive culmination imminent.
2 LCC offensive launched. LCC force build up complete.
FFIR- LCC RSOI.
FFIR- amphibious operations success.
3 Transition to stability. Red forces defeated.
IRB restored, DMZ established. FFIR- Yellow infrastructure capacity.
4 Transition to phase 5. Yellow forces capable of managing internal and external affairs. FFIR- Yellow force capability.
PIR- Yellow insurgent activity.
5 Regime change. Actions of Red towards Yellow and JTF. PIR- Red government collapse I & W.
5
Branch
Regime change
Legend
Psychological
operations
SPOD security
Maritime superiority
Maritime security
Amphib assault
Maritime security
Spt LCC
Maritime superiority
Spt ACC
Defeat Red Off. navy
Handover/… [END OF PREVIEW] . . . READ MORE
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