Thesis: Foreign Policy of China (Beijing

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[. . .] But just as China (Beijing consensus)'s economic and military power does not yet match that of the United States, China (Beijing consensus)'s soft power still has a long way to go as demonstrated by a Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll. China (Beijing consensus) does not have cultural industries like Hollywood, and its universities are not yet the equal of the United States. It lacks the many non-governmental organizations that generate much of U.S. soft power. Politically, China (Beijing consensus) suffers from corruption, inequality, and a lack of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. While that may make the "Beijing consensus" attractive in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian developing countries, it undercuts China (Beijing consensus)'s soft power in the West. Although China (Beijing consensus)'s new diplomacy has enhanced its attractiveness to its neighbors in Southeast Asia, the belligerence of its hard power stance toward Taiwan hurt it in Europe when China (Beijing consensus) sought to persuade Europeans to relax their embargo on the sale of arms. Given the domestic problems that China (Beijing consensus) must still overcome, there are limits to China (Beijing consensus)'s ability to attract others, but one would be foolish to ignore the gains the country is making.

As with all countries, there are multiple dimensions to China (Beijing consensus)'s foreign relations. These include the normal forms of diplomatic interactions, national security policy, foreign economic relations, and, more peculiar to the Chinese case, at least until recently, formal relations with other Communist parties and policies toward Hong Kong (and Macao), Taiwan, and Overseas Chinese generally. This list does not exhaust the range of policymakers and actors involved with international developments- many sub-national actors are now important in the international economy and the open door policy-- and the list excludes, to some extent, actors involved in "twenty-first-century issues," such as environmental problems, illegal emigration, drug trafficking, and criminal organizations (Foster, 1903, p. 256). It is important to realize that, in practice, foreign policy has a narrower focus in China (Beijing consensus) than it does in the United States. In the Chinese context, waijiao guanxi (foreign relations) is almost exclusively diplomatic in nature. Military and international economic aspects of foreign relations are not central in accounts of Chinese foreign relations if they are mentioned at all. Instead, what in Chinese is called waijiao is best seen as diplomacy -- negotiations, affairs of state, and so forth, as executed between China (Beijing consensus)'s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its counterparts in other countries. The lack of a broad history of China (Beijing consensus)'s relations with the world should not be taken to imply that political-military strategies and the use of force have not been central to China (Beijing consensus)'s interactions with the outside world. China (Beijing consensus) has used or has threatened to use force extensively since 1949 (Foster, 1903, p. 256). To give an incomplete listing: Moreover, throughout most of its history, the PRC faced direct challenges to its security from either and, on occasion, both superpowers. Indeed, the international security challenges to China (Beijing consensus) were the core elements of China (Beijing consensus)'s foreign affairs until 1989 or so. These challenges reverberated profoundly within China (Beijing consensus) -- causing Mao to push for the development of nuclear weapons in 1955 and nuclear- powered submarines in 1958, as well as for a series of nuclear-capable missiles in the 1960s and 1970s (Sutter & Choi, 1996, p. 27).

Chapter 2

2.1 Structure of Chinese Foreign Policy

A: The "Chinese Model" of Investment

Before the 1990s, the PRC's Africa policy was purely political: China fostered anti-colonial and postcolonial solidarity (Hutchinson 1976), and such efforts were repaid through African states' recognition of the PRC (Nwugo 1977). The symbol of China-Africa relations from the 1960s to the 1980s was the Tanzania-Zambia railway (Tazara), built by fifty thousand Chinese laborers (Hall 8c Peyman 1976; Monson 2004-5). China's practice of supporting developing state initiatives and providing aid that did not enrich elites still resonates with Africans today, even though, since the 1990s, PRC activism on behalf of developing states has waned and much of what it does in Africa is now profit-centered (Chen 2001; Alden 2005).

Postcolonial Africa is often seen mostly in terms of its problems: as burdened by civil wars, epidemics, and venal regimes that aggravate endemic poverty. These perceptions led to a post-Cold War Afro-pessimism or even Afro phobia and to the downgrading of Africa as a site of interest for policymakers and investors from the developed world (Rieff 1998; Economist 1997; Andreasson 2005). This began to change somewhat in the 1990s, as Western leaders again began to pay attention to the continent, partly because of China's increased presence, which grew by 700% during the decade. While many Africans still believe that Africa remains in many respects invisible, especially to the United States (Jaffer 2004; Pan 2006), there is no doubt that China, Britain, France, and the U.S. see themselves as competitors in the second largest continent with the fastest growing population: with 900 million people in 2005, less than one-seventh of the world's people, Africa is projected to have nearly a quarter of the global population by 2050, and it has been estimated that Africa's economy may double in a generation {Ethiopian Herald 2005; Dyer 2007).

From 2001 to 2004, Africa's average annual intake from foreign direct investment (FDI) was only $15-18b, despite the continent's providing the world's highest FDI returns, averaging 29% in the 1990s and 40% by 2005. FDI flows in Africa in 2005 jumped to $29b (of $897b in global FDI flows), but China's FDI stock in Africa was still only $lb of Africa's $96b in FDI stock (two-thirds of its European-half British or French -- and one-fifth North American). By late 2006, however, China's investments in Africa were pegged at almost $8b, as pledged investments were actualized. China will soon become one of Africa's top three FDI providers. Since the 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, that effort has been aided by a $5b China-Africa Development Fund to spur PRC investment. Trade with Africa was a tiny part of the PRC's 2006 $1.76 trillion in world trade, but had grown from $3b in 1995 to $10b in 2000, $40b in 2005, and $55b in 2006, balanced slightly in Africa's favor. There were more than eight hundred Chinese enterprises in Africa in 2006, one hundred of them medium and large state-owned firms {Xinhua 2007a). The PRC accounts for only a tiny part of Africa's FDI ($3.6b in 2004 and $6.9b in 2005), but its firms invested $135m and $280m, respectively, in those years. Still, while China is the third largest trader with Africa, after the U.S. And France, its trade was well behind the United States's $91b and represents only one-tenth of Africa's world trade, most of which remains with the E.U. And U.S.

Between the end of the last century and the beginning of this century, Africa's overall share of world trade and global FDI inflows actually declined: in the 1970s Africa received 5% of the former and 6% of the latter, but in 2005 the figures were 1.5% and 3%, respectively (AFP 2006a; Herald 2005; RTE 2005; UNCTAD 2006:40). Many PRC and African analysts contend, therefore, that increased PRC trade and investment ease Africa's dependence on the West and are mutually beneficial {Indian Express, 2006; Itano 2005; Li Yong 2003). The U.N. Development Program agrees and underwrites a China-Africa Business Council that promotes PRC investment in Africa (CABC 2006).

Africa is the most resource-laden continent, with every primary product required for industry, including (in 2005) 10 million (m) of the globe's 84m barrels per day (bpd) of oil production. Some 85% of new oil reserves found from 2001 to 2004 were on west/central African coasts, most of it light, sweet, highly profitable crude. Strong competition for African oil exists because 90% of the world's untapped conventional oil reserves are owned by states, and 75% of known reserves are in states that exclude or sharply limit outside investment in oil. According to estimates, world demand for oil may reach 115m bpd by 2030. In 2005 the U.S. imported 60% of its 20m bpd of oil, 16% from Africa. In 2006, however, U.S. imports of oil from Africa equaled or slightly surpassed those from the Middle East, with both at 22% of total imports (2.23m bpd). oil today accounts for more than 70% of all U.S. imports from Africa.8 In 2005 China imported 48% of its 7.2m bpd, with 38% of its imports from Africa (1.33m bpd). By 2025, its imports should reach 10.7m bpd, 75% of consumption. More than 60% of the output of Sudan, Africa's third largest oil producer, went to China and supplied 5% of PRC oil needs.… [END OF PREVIEW]

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Foreign Policy of China (Beijing.  (2011, September 13).  Retrieved March 19, 2019, from

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"Foreign Policy of China (Beijing."  13 September 2011.  Web.  19 March 2019. <>.

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"Foreign Policy of China (Beijing."  September 13, 2011.  Accessed March 19, 2019.