History of Espionage Class Reading Essay

Pages: 27 (7517 words)  ·  Bibliography Sources: 29  ·  File: .docx  ·  Level: Master's  ·  Topic: Drama - World

History Of Espionage Class Reading Study Guides

Jeffrey Burds, Chapter 19 of World of the Shadows: An International History of Espionage (The Golden Age of Soviet "Illegals")

This chapter opens with a quote from Stalin, who in 1937 questioned the prevailing belief that bourgeoisie states would refrain from sending "spies, wreckers, saboteurs and assassins" into socialist states.

Chapter 19 then moves to a discussion of the so-called "Cambridge Five," a group of five British nationals who spied for the Soviets during WWII.

Donald Maclean (1915-1983), Foreign Office secretary, Paris, Washington, Cairo, London.

Guy Francis de Moncy Burgess (1910-1963), BBC broadcaster, agent in MI6, secretary to Deputy Foreign Minister

Harold Adrian Russell ("Kim") Philby (1912-1988), journalist, agent in MI6, "The Third Man"

Anthony F. Blunt (1907-1983), tutor of French, art historian, art adviser to Queen Elizabeth, agent in MI5 during World War Two, "The Fourth Man"

John Cairncross (25 July 1913 -- 8 October 1995), the suspected "Fifth Man"

The "Cambridge Five" passed documents and information to the Soviets throughout and after WWII, and "According to Russian archives, between 1941 and 1945, Cairncross supplied the Soviets with 5,832 documents."

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The Chapter then moves on to discuss Alexandre Orlov, whose Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare was published in 1963. Orlov was a trusted Communist party member who helped design the Golden Age of Great Illegals in Soviet spy networks in the 1930's. In 1938, Orlov was recalled to Moscow and he suspected he would be executed as a part of Stalin's "purge," so he fled to America with a forged passport.

TOPIC: Essay on History of Espionage Class Reading Assignment

Orlov published the Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare to help avoid financial destitution, and his book covered many of the Soviet's most effective tactics for Verbovka, or the recruitment of sources for espionage activities. In his review of recruitment techniques, Orlov revealed that blackmail and other coercive methods of controlling informants were not used by the Soviets, despite American claims that their citizens had been forced to conduct illicit spying activities.

To bring the chapter full circle, we learn how Orlov himself helped to recruit many of the "Cambridge Five," with his luring of Philby standing as the most impactful maneuver. We learn that Orlov escorted Philby on a trip to Berlin, to see the horrors of fascism firsthand, and that Orlov eventually helped to mastermind the recruitment of the "Cambridge Five."

The chapter concludes with a discussion of The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Second World War, including a review of Neville Chamberlain's infamous 1938 meeting with Adolf Hitler, during which the British Prime Minister allowed himself to be fooled into a policy of appeasement.

October 21st -- L. Dvoinikh and N. Tarkhova, "What Military Intelligence Reported Historians Have a Chance to Analyze: Soviet Intelligence Dispatches on the Eve of War"

This reading discusses the German invasion of the Soviet Union from the perspective of intelligence gathering agencies within Soviet regime.

The authors dispute the traditional Russian view of the Nazi invasion as being a surprise, sneak attack launched suddenly and unexpectedly, and the reading represents the author's attempt to prove that Soviet intelligence did indeed know a German attack was imminent.

According to the authors, "in December 1940, Razvedupr [the Intelligence Directorate] of the General Staff of the Red Army drew up a "mobilization report" on Germany," and the reading includes several other points of evidence suggesting that the Soviets were prepared to anticipate an attack from their Nazi "allies."

In explaining the Soviet's slow response to German advances, and a series of military failures during the first few months of engagement, the authors point to the "Great Terror" of the 1930s, a purge which left the Soviet military structure devoid of experienced leaders.

The intense campaign of disinformation which was used by the Germans at this time is also discussed, as is the impact of this subterfuge on the Soviet military's ability to prepare troops, plan strategies and deploy resources appropriately.

The chapter concludes with an analysis of actual correspondence between Soviet intelligence officials during the run-up to Germany's invasion. This exercise is highly informative, as it allows the reader to follow the convoluted chain of command which was used to report German troop movements, mobilization capabilities, and other crucial factors for intelligence-based war planning.

October 21st -- Peter Kahn, "The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor"

This reading provides a detailed review of the circumstances which preceded the Japanese attack on American naval interests in Pearl Harbor. The author begins with an anecdote about Frank B. Rowlett, a civilian employee of the U.S. Army tasked with cracking the PURPLE code used to cipher Japanese diplomatic cables, before moving on to a historical review of the tense relationship between Japan and the U.S.

The reading then delves into a comprehensive review of American/Japanese relations during the 20th century, highlighting instances of diplomatic duplicity wherein American codebreakers used their knowledge of internal Japanese messages to force their hand during major negotiations.

In 1929 Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson issued a mandate to avoid the use of codebreaking, saying that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail," and just two years later now-unemployed cryptanalyst Herbert O. Yardley published a book revealing the extent of American intelligence gathering against Japanese interests.

This revelation was a major embarrassment for the Japanese government, and soon afterward the nation's encryption system was strengthened considerably, leaving American intelligence agencies in the proverbial dark as Japan began initial preparations for the Pearl Harbor attack.

On September 20th, 1940, with European nations falling to the Axis powers and Japan expanding its military capabilities, William H. Friedman and his team of cryptanalysts including Rowlett (first bullet point) -- finally cracked the PURPLE code.

In 1941, several PURPLE coded messages indicating that Japan was preparing for imminent war were deciphered, but these messages were diplomatic rather than military in nature, and thus did not provide information on naval movements, exercises, etc.

Nonetheless, the study of Japanese naval traffic patterns produced a viable pattern of ship deployment and radio darkness during major operations, and the intelligence community had several other legitimate clues that the Pearl Harbor attack would soon be launched. Despite the mounting evidence, however, American leaders discounted the possibility of a sneak attack as improbable, and the nation's naval centerpiece in Pearl Harbor was left relatively undefended.

The reading concluded with a review of American intelligence failures prior to Pearl Harbor, including the deciphering of only diplomatic cables, a bigoted cultural dismissiveness towards Japanese capabilities, and the targeted use of intelligence "noise" by the Japanese for the sake of distraction and disinformation.

October 21st -- Ken Kotani, Japanese Intelligence in World War II, pp. 55-58, 76-86.

This reading expands on the previous entry by discussing Japanese intelligence gathering activity targeting American interests prior to and during WWII.

The author talks about the division between the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), which operated as two separate entities and did not always share information efficiently.

According to Kotani, the Japanese military directed much of its intelligence gathering capabilities to observing their aggressive and unpredictable Soviet neighbors, a strategy which eventually resulted in an "intelligence deficit" as Japan engaged in armed conflict with American forces in the wake of Pearl Harbor.

Kotani provides several intriguing statistics to underscore the lack of intelligence utilized by the Japanese military, including the starting fact that "only eight staff officers were dedicated to U.S. And UK intelligence within the Army General Staff during the battle of Guadacanal."

Only after the Japanese were defeated soundly at Guadacanal, and again at the battle of Leyte Gulf, did their military leadership shift the intelligence gathering priority from the Soviet Union to America.

The reading then moves on to a review of accelerated and improved Japanese intelligence gathering techniques, including the work of Naosada Koshiba, an IJN operative who pioneered the nation's use of naval human intelligence (Naval HUMINT) throughout China and the Pacific theatre.

The story of ex-British officer F.J. Rutland is also reviewed, as this man was employed by the IJN for a number of years, helping to lay the groundwork for Japanese naval espionage on American soil during the 1930s.

October 21st -- Jeffrey Burds, Chapter 20 of World of the Shadows: An International History of Espionage

This chapter covers the infamous German invasion of the Soviet Union in June of 1941

also known as Operation Barbarossa -- from an intelligence gathering perspective.

The chapter discusses Stalin's increased paranoia regarding Winston Churchill's supposed plan to lure the Soviets into a war with their ostensible allies in Nazi Germany, as he willfully ignored no less than 84 reports on German troop buildups, demonstrating that viable intelligence is useless if not wielded effectively by competent state leaders.

Simply put, Stalin refused to believe mounting evidence that Hitler was plotting to betray him, and in spite of documented evidence of a looming Nazi invasion, the Soviet premier stubbornly refused to even consider the possibility.

The following question provides the foundation of this chapter's… [END OF PREVIEW] . . . READ MORE

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