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How Military Logic Is Translated Into PolicyResearch Paper

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¶ … end state for Somalia is to have a rebuilt country that is politically, economically and socially stable with strong centralized offices of government and peaceful and harmonious relationships with regional leaders. This means that the terroristic threat of al-Qaida needs to be eliminated and that sound investments in the country's infrastructure need to be established that can assist in the rebuilding process. Essentially, the end state is one in which leaders from the business community collaborate with clan leaders, civil society groups and moderates in order to affect a balanced power structure that cohesively joins the various peaceful goal-oriented groups in their efforts to modernize and grow Somalia.

The Ends (Objectives) of the U.S. for Somalia are two-fold: first, it aims for the state to cease posing as a "terrorist" platform and to develop a "functioning central government" that can provide adequate stability in terms of political structure; second, it aims for the state to meet the "humanitarian needs of the Somali people,"[footnoteRef:1] which have grown as a result of floods, droughts, lack of cohesion and terroristic growth. [1: Comprehensive Regional Strategy on Somalia: A Strategy for U.S. Engagement -- Report to Congress (February 2007), 1.]

The Ends are to lead to the accomplishment of the desired end state by facilitating the opposition to al-Qaeda, which acts as a consolidating force against the Somali government. This means soldiers must be mobilized and a transitional force established that can help the Somali government stabilize in the face of organized opposition.

The Ways and Means associated with the two-fold objectives are, first, the utilization of "an African stabilization force" and the mobilization of "international assistance" (the means) in order to support "an inclusive government of national unity" and develop a "framework of the Transitional Federal Charter" (the Ways).[footnoteRef:2] Second, the U.S. should encourage the Transitional Federal Government to "dialogue" with different parties in the nation in order to establish a unified front against al-Qaeda opposition as well as to construct pathways to social responsibility programs through which international relief can be established. International donor support and political discourse would be the means towards this end, with dialoguing and unification through propagation of ideals (end-states) through media as the ways. [2: Comprehensive Regional Strategy on Somalia: A Strategy for U.S. Engagement -- Report to Congress (February 2007), 2.]

As Yarger notes, "strategic objectives maintain their validity, while providing for adaptability and flexibility, by focusing on root purposes and causes."[footnoteRef:3] The strategic objectives in the case of Somalia are the unification of the Somali political front, among social, political and economic influences, against al-Qaeda; and the utilization of international forces to help consolidate this effort. In each case, there is feasibility, acceptability and suitability. [3: Harry Yarger, "Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy." Strategic Studies Institute (February 2006), 9.]

As far as unification goes, the various forces in Somali and the inter-African nations want peace within their borders and relations, which means military opposition to terrorist networks. This is an acceptable strategic objective to the nations as it rids them of the foreign element currently antagonizing the people, and it is suitable because it addresses the inherent needs of the locality.

Regarding the adoption of international assistance through donors, discourse, and relief efforts, the root problems of internal society within Somali (which makes the populace a target of al-Qaeda) can be addressed in a feasible manner -- namely through the use of funds gathered from international donors. This would be acceptable to the nation because it supports building the infrastructure and it is suitable because it eliminates the desperate conditions that would otherwise prevail and make the populace a breeding ground of discontentment, which would in turn make the people vulnerable to predatory recruiting from terror networks like al-Qaeda which prey on discontentment and lure youths by promising a better life through terror cells.

The overall strategy is valid because it meets the prescribed notions of feasibility, acceptability, and suitability not only among Somalis but also among the international community which also wants to see Somali improved, made stronger and more stable and changed from a platform of al-Qaeda to one of peace and prosperity.

The risks in terms of balance are located in the ability to develop cohesiveness and unity among differing factions among the Somali people. Various groups, women's groups, political groups, and religious groups must be brought under one democratic umbrella and balance is key to this objective. The risk is that too much weight will be given one particular subset which in turn undermines the entire activity.

The risks in terms of chance, friction and unintended consequences are found in the nexus of unaccountability: it cannot be known 100% ahead of time how groups or people will react, especially when self-interest is involved. The key to eliminating friction, unintended consequences and leaving things to chance is to demonstrate a high degree of control in terms of fairness and allocating principle. International funds, for example, should not be used to benefit one political office or one sector, but several sectors and several groups as a whole with the military community reinforcing the building up of the infrastructure and the maintenance of order within society by opposing terror networks.

The risks in terms of reactions of others, invalid assumptions, flexibility and internal/external factors can be viewed simultaneously, as each is part of the same fundamental objective, which is to bring stability and peace to Somalia. Some will oppose foreign intervention (like al-Qaeda), others will view the intervention as corruptive with ulterior motives (invalid assumptions); the risks of not being flexible are diminished when the strategy allows for a healthy exchange of ideas without any predetermined goal or arrangement (other than progress in terms of peace). And the risks from internal/external factors are mitigated by the build-up of international troops and the training of local law enforcement, which puts the nation on a footing with neighbors and allows it to be accountability and ultimately self-reliant as well.

Supplements

1)

CCS is a way for every branch and department to be on the same page in terms of striving towards the desired end-state. It makes communication one of the highest priorities and emphasizes the point by showing that silence is much worse than communicating too much. Communication is one of the key ways of rallying a community or populace around an objective, and taking heed of those methods of communication and how to use them is the goal.

In terms of reaching an audience, it is important to know who the stakeholders are and who the public is. Synchronized communication allows for information to flow from the top down so that the troops on the ground, aka the stakeholders, are mobilized according to the strategy designed to bring about the desired end-state. Information is a great tool/weapon -- as great as any military arsenal because it shapes the minds and wills of stakeholders who then shape society and forge the front lines of the battle.

Themes can be consistently relayed through CCS and reiterated in numerous, repeated ways so that they become ingrained in the audience; likewise the messages that are communicated are done so in a more effective way that leaves no stone unturned. The audience is thereby totally submersed in the information flow provided by CCS, whereas without CCS the audience would be susceptible to a separate information campaign and could be swayed into the hands of the enemy.

2)

The joint force should prepare to meet threats, challenges and opportunities in the ISE over the next fifteen years by focusing on the main three sectors of life -- individuals, values, and politics. In terms of "empowering individuals" it is essential to support the middle class through education, information flow (CCS) and control of the Internet.[footnoteRef:4] [4: Global Trends Report, 28-33.]

As for utilizing values to meet threats, the joint force can promote women's rights through CCS, focus on climate change issues, foster dialogue among nations, work towards achieving an international standard that sets a goal for the next 15 years in terms of climate protection, and draw attention to the dangers of extremism and nationalism. The use of political focus can be utilized here in that a demand for participatory democracy, identities and ideologies that do not conflict but do provide for various perspectives, can help stem off politically incorrect agendas that attempt to disrupt the overall aim and objective of the state. Challenges, such as the spread of terror networks, can be viewed as opportunities to take control of information flow channels such as the Internet through the passing of legislation and the adoption of more community-driven and insistence upon respectful discourse.

3)

The significance and purpose of the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy is rooted in the need to meet the changes that we face in modern society with positive and progressive results. The NSS is significant specifically because it acknowledges the world as it is without any… [END OF PREVIEW]

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