Research Paper: Soviet Perspective of the Cuban

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[. . .] Marshal Sergei Biryuzov, who was the Soviet Rocket Forces Chief at the time, brought a market research team that arrived within Cuba. He told Khrushchev the missiles could be hidden and camouflaged through the palms (Correll, 2005).

The Cuban leadership was further upset as September came along as the U.S. States Congress accepted the U.S. Joint Resolution 230. This resolution basically stated that Congress's solution to evade the development of an externally-assisted military structure (Bligh et al., 2002). On the day that, the United States introduced a significant military exercise within the Caribbean, titled the PHIBRIGLEX-62, Cuba denounced globally that this move was like a purposeful aggravation and proof the U.S. having the intention to once again take over the region of Cuba (Blight al, 2002).

Khrushchev and Castro decided to place proper nuclear missiles privately in Cuba. Similar to the perspective of Castro, Khrushchev felt that the potential of U.S. taking over Cuba was looming, and thus to get rid of that link for Russia from Cuba to the western territory would do great injury to the communist cause, particularly in Latin America. He stated he desired to face the American democracy "using more than mere words, and instead use an aggressive action and the most logical aggressive action was the use of missiles (Weldes, 1999). The Soviets were able to sustain the level of secrecy by encoding their overall plans and getting approval from Rodion Malinovsky as well as Khrushchev for those plans across the first week of July.

The Soviet leadership was sure of the fact that, according to their thought of Kennedy's insufficient confidence throughout the Bay of Pigs Invasion, he would evade any form of clash and recognize the missiles like a fait accompli (Absher, 2009). On the eve of September 11, the U.S.S.R. openly cautioned that the U.S. strike on Cuba or on the Soviet ships transporting supplies towards the island would be interpreted as an invitation to war (Absher, 2009). The Soviets continued on with their Maskirovka program to hide their actions in Cuba. They frequently refused that the use and engagement of weapons within the region of Cuba was aimed to be offensive in character. On September 7, the Soviet Ambassador stationed within the U.S. States -- Anatoly Dobrynin assured the U.S. States Ambassador for the UN -- Adlai Stevenson -- that the U.S.S.R. was delivering a range of merely defensive weaponry within Cuba. On September 11, the Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza (which is a Soviet News Agency also known simply as TASS) stated expressively that the U.S.S.R. didn't have any aims or requirements for introducing an offensive nuclear missiles strike on the state of Cuba. On October 13, Dobrynin was asked by former Undersecretary of State -- Chester Bowles -- about the aims and intentions of the Soviets for placing the offensive weaponry and gear within Cuba. He refused to have any aggressive plans (Blight et al., 2002). And again on October 17, the Soviet embassy representative Georgy Bolshakov sent President Kennedy a "personal message" from the Russian leader -- Khrushchev -- where he reassured him that "on no account would surface-to-surface missiles be delivered and/or engaged in Cuba" (Blight et al., 2002).

As soon as the month of August in 1962 started, the U.S. States suspected the Soviets of creating missile facilities in Cuba. Throughout that month, its intelligence services collected details about sightings by ground experts of Russian-built MiG-21 martial artists and Il-28 light bombers. There was evidence of a number of U-2 spy planes found S-75 Dvina (NATO designation SA-2) surface-to-air missile industries that work coherently placed and working across eight differing regions in Cuba. The CIA director at the time -- John A. McCone -- grew suspicious with this chain of activity. Delivering antiaircraft missiles into Cuba, he believed, was logical only when Moscow intended for their services to defend basics for ballistic missiles targeted in the U.S. States (Allison et al., 1999). On August 10, he authorized a memo to President Kennedy by which he stated his suspicions of the Soviet networks and their intention to probably planning the engagement of ballistic missiles within Cuba (Correll, 2005). On August 31, Senator of the state of New York at the time -- Kenneth Keating -- who most likely attained all his evidence and confirmation date from the Cuban exiles within Florida (Correll, 2005), cautioned on the Senate meetings that the U.S.S.R. might be creating a missile base within the vicinities of Cuba for aggressive purposes (Absher, 2009).

Air Pressure General Curtis LeMay showed a pre-invasion strike plan and intention to President Kennedy in the month of September, while, on the other, the spy plane tickets and smaller military clashes for the U.S. forces at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base were the topic of frequent Cuban diplomatic protests to the federal government (Absher, 2009).

The fact was that the very first consignment of R-12 missiles surfaced on record around the evening of September 8, then another on the day of September 16. The R-12 missile had been the very first fully-functionaly intermediate-range ballistic missile for the Soviets. It was also the very first missile that was mass-created at that expansive level and, it was also the first Soviet missile used that had a thermonuclear warhead. It had been just one-stage, transportable, surface-released, storage liquid propellant fuelled missile that may bring or transport a megaton-level nuclear weapon (Correll, 2005). The Soviets were in the process of constructing a total of nine different sites, six of which were being constructed for the R-12 medium-range missiles (NATO designation SS-4 Sandal) and three designated sites for R-14 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (NATO designation SS-5 Skean). The former would be spread across 2,000 kms (1,200 mi) while the latter would be spread across 4,500 kms (2,800 mi) (Correll, 2005).

The political and military motivations of the United States

The American Democracy feared the Soviet growth of Communism, however for a Latin American nation to freely support using the territory of USSR was regarded as unacceptable, because of the Soviet-American clash. This kind of participation would also openly challenge the Monroe Doctrine a U.S. States standard which, while restricting the U.S. States' participation with European colonies and European matters, alleged that European forces should not have participation with states within the Western Hemisphere.

The U.S. States had been embarrassed openly through the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961 that was lead by President Kennedy against the CIA-trained masses of Cuban exiles. After, former Leader Eisenhower told Kennedy that the failure from the Bay of Pigs will encourage the Soviets to behave differently and more defiantly (Absher, 2009). The half-hearted strike had also encouraged the likes of Nikita Khrushchev and the advisors with the idea that Kennedy was indecisive, youthful, intellectual, and ill-prepared for making decisions in emergency situations (Absher, 2009). U.S. covert procedures that were ongoing in the year 1961 were primarily using the futile structure of Operation Mongoose (Absher, 2009).

Additionally, Khrushchev's perception of Kennedy's limitations was completed and supported through the President's soft response throughout the Berlin Crisis of 1961, especially regarding the issue of the Berlin Wall. Talking with Soviet authorities as a direct consequence from the crisis, Khrushchev understood several reasons why Kennedy did not have a powerful background, nor, in most cases, did he possess the courage to endure a significant challenge. Also, he told his boy Sergei that on Cuba, Kennedy will most like first create a fussy interaction, take it a few notches, but then, finally agree to the terms that Khrushchev would set (Rodriguez, 1989).

In the month of January 1962, General Edward Lansdale referred to the intentions to overthrow the Cuban Government inside a top-secret report (partly declassified 1989), addressed to President Kennedy and authorities associated with Operation Mongoose (Absher, 2009). CIA agents, specialists or "pathfinders" within the Special Activities Division may be transported into Cuba to handle damage and association, inclusive of aspects of radio broadcasts (Rodriguez, 1989). In Feb 1962, the U.S. States released a blockade against Cuba (Rodriguez, 1989), and Lansdale also exhibited a supporting 26-page, highly-classified timetable for implementation of the overthrow of the Cuban Government, mandating that guerrilla procedures were to be practiced from August and September. This timetable also stated that in the very first few days of October the intention was to freely revolt against and overthrow the Communist government in the region " (Absher, 2009).

The missiles in Cuba permitted the Soviets to effectively target almost the whole continental U.S. States. The planned toolbox was forty launchers. The Cuban population willingly observed the appearance and deployment from the missiles and 100s of daily reports and news arrived at Miami. U.S. intelligence received numerous reviews and reports regarding several that were of dubious nature or perhaps laughable, and many of which might be ignored as explaining defensive missiles. Only five reports eventually bothered the U.S. experts. They referred to large trucks passing through cities during the night transporting very lengthy canvas-covered round objects that may not make… [END OF PREVIEW]

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Soviet Perspective of the Cuban.  (2012, September 25).  Retrieved July 18, 2019, from https://www.essaytown.com/subjects/paper/soviet-perspective-cuban/5826567

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"Soviet Perspective of the Cuban."  25 September 2012.  Web.  18 July 2019. <https://www.essaytown.com/subjects/paper/soviet-perspective-cuban/5826567>.

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"Soviet Perspective of the Cuban."  Essaytown.com.  September 25, 2012.  Accessed July 18, 2019.
https://www.essaytown.com/subjects/paper/soviet-perspective-cuban/5826567.